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The Pringle1 case is one of the most interesting cases of the European 
Court of Justice (CJEU) for economic relations in the European Union.  
The annotated judgment is significant for this reason, that the Court,  
in times of economic and political crisis in Europe, once again underscores 
some international law principles, belonging to the core of the European 
integration process2.  
                                                     
*  PhD, a Lecturer in the Department of European Law, Faculty of Law and Administration, 
Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun, Poland, specialising in the Law of the European 
Union e-mail: akp@law.uni.torun.pl. 
1  Thomas Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland, the Attorney General, Case C-312/12, 
Judgment of 27.11.2012, OJ C 303, 6.10.2012. 
2  On the broader legal reasons for the financial stability amendment, see for example:  
B. de Witte, The European Treaty Amendment for the Creation of a Financial Stability Mechanism, 
European Policy Analysis 2011, vol. 6, pp. 1-8; J. Barcz, Środki międzyrządowe konsolidujące 
strefę euro (w świetle wyroku Trybunału Sprawiedliwości UE w sprawie Pringle) [Intergovernmental 
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The importance of the case, instituted by Thomas Pringle, a member  
of the lower house of the Irish parliament, appears from the fact,  
that the Court, for the first time, decided about the validity of the decision 
which had added to the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) a new provision (Article 136(3) TFEU) allowing for the creation  
of a financial rescue mechanism by the euro area countries. The Court  
laid down the criteria according to which Treaty amendments under  
the simplified revision procedure can be reviewed and they approved  
the creation of the European Stability Mechanisms (ESM) outside  
the EU legal order. The Court of Justice judgment opens up new avenues 
for further research into the European monetary and economic governance. 
The ESM and the European Council Decision 2011/199/EU amending 
Article 136 TFEU with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States 
whose currency is the euro3 was subject to judicial review in five Member 
States’ highest courts and tribunals: the Supreme Court of Ireland,  
the Estonian Supreme Court4, the German Federal Constitutional Court5, 
the Polish Constitutional Tribunal6 and the Austrian Constitutional Court7 
and also before the Constitutional Committee of the Finnish Parliament and 
the European Union Committee of the House of Lords of the United 
Kingdom, but only the Supreme Court of Ireland decided to engage  
                                                                                                                                 
Measures Consolidating the Euro Area (in the Light of Judgment of the Court of Justice  
of the EU in Pringle Case] Państwo i Prawo [State and Law] 2013, vol. 8, pp. 3-19.  
3  European Council Decision 2011/199/EU of 25.03.2011 amending Article 136 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member 
States whose currency is the euro, OJ L 91, 6.04.2011, p. 1. 
4  Supreme Court of Estonia, Judgment of the Supreme Court en banc of 12.07.2012,  
Case No. 3-4-1-6-12, available at: http://www.riigikohus.ee/?id=1347 [last accessed: 
30.09.2013]. 
5  Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of the Second Senate of 12.09.2012, 2 BvR 1390/12, 
available at: http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20120912_ 
2bvr139012.html [last accessed: 30.09.2013]. 
6  Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment of 26.06.2013, K 33/12, available at: 
http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/OTK/ezd/sprawa_lista_plikow.asp?syg=K%2033/12 [last 
accessed: 30.09.2013]. 
7  Austrian Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment of 25.02.2013, G 104/12‐8, available at: 
http://www.vfgh.gv.at/cms/vfgh-site/attachments/6/3/5/CH0006/CMS1363689557948 
/esm_strache_g104-8.12.pdf [last accessed: 30.09.2013]. 
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in a judicial dialogue with the CJEU pursuant to the preliminary reference 
mechanism8. 
After a short overview of the General Court’s reasoning and the view  
of the Advocate General, the questions will be only briefly discussed: could 
the Court of Justice review the legality of a European Council Decision 
which adopts amendments of the TFEU according to the two simplified 
procedures for Treaty amendment introduced by the Lisbon Treaty,  
and whether the European Council Decision 2011/199/EU amending 
Article 136 TFEU with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States 
whose currency is the euro entails an alteration of the competences  
of the European Union contrary to the third paragraph of Article 48(6) 
Treaty on European Union (TEU)9.  
  
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Article 48(6) of the Treaty on European Union allows the European 
Council, acting in unanimity after consulting the European Parliament,  
the Commission and, in certain cases, the European Central Bank, to adopt 
a decision amending all or part of the provisions of Part Three of the Treaty 
on the functioning of the European Union. Such a decision may not 
increase the competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties,  
and its entry into force is conditional upon its subsequent approval  
by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements.  
In May 2010 the EU and the group of its Member States, decided  
to create two new legal instruments, called the European Financial Stability 
                                                     
8  E. Fahey, S. Bardutzky, Judicial Review of Eurozone Law: The Adjudication of Postnational 
Norms in EU Courts, Plural – A Casestudy of the European Stability Mechanism, Michigan  
Journal of International Law 2013, vol. 34, pp. 3-16, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2287917 [last accessed: 15.09.2013]. For a recent overview, see also: 
J. Tomkin, Contradiction, Circumvention and Conceptual Gymnastics: The Impact of the Adoption  
of the ESM Treaty on the State of European Democracy, German Law Journal 2013, vol. 14,  
pp. 169-190, available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID= 
11&artID=1500 [last accessed: 15.09.2013]. 
9  For a more elaborate discussion of this case see: B. de Witte, T. Beukers, A Court of Justice 
Approves the Creation of European Stability Mechanism Outside the EU Legal Order: Pringle, 
Common Market Law Review 2013, vol. 50, pp. 805-848.  
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Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)10. 
The European Council agreed on 17 December 2010 on the need for euro 
area Member States to establish a permanent stability mechanism. 
At its meeting on 24–25 March 2011, the European Council 
unanimously adopted a decision under Article 48(6) TEU amending  
Article 136 TFEU. The decision 2011/199/EU provides that the following 
paragraph shall be added to Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning  
of the European Union: “3. The Member States whose currency is the euro 
may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable  
to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting  
of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made 
subject to strict conditionality”. 
On 2 February 2012 the Member States whose currency is the euro 
signed a Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (“the ESM 
Treaty”). That “European Stability Mechanism” is, under Article 1  
of the ESM Treaty, an “international financial institution” whose members 
are the euro area Member States, and which, in accordance with the first 
sentence of Article 3 of the Treaty, has the following mission: “the purpose 
of the ESM shall be to mobilise funding and provide stability support 
under strict conditionality, appropriate to the financial assistance 
instrument chosen, to the benefit of ESM Members which are experiencing, 
or are threatened by, severe financing problems, if indispensable  
to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole  
and of its Member States. For this purpose, the ESM shall be entitled  
to raise funds by issuing financial instruments or by entering into financial 
or other agreements or arrangements with ESM Members, financial 
institutions or other third parties”. 
Thomas Pringle brought before the High Court (Ireland) an action 
against the defendants in the main proceedings in support of which  
he claimed, first, that Decision 2011/199 was not lawfully adopted 
                                                     
10  For a general discussion of a new set of regulations, procedures and institutions that have 
come to be known as the “new European economic governance” see: G.M. Barrett,  
Does the Treaty Amendment on the European Stability Mechanism Require a Referendum  
in Ireland?, available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1938659 [last accessed: 15.09.2013] 
and Ch. Degryse, The New European Economic Governance (November 30, 2012), European Trade 
Union Institute Working Paper 2012.14. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.220270 
[last accessed: 15.09.2013]. 
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pursuant to the simplified revision procedure provided by Article 48(6) 
TEU because it entails an alteration to the competences of the European 
Union contrary to the third paragraph of Article 48(6) TEU and that 
Decision 2011/199 is inconsistent with provisions of the TEU and TFEU 
Treaties concerning economic and monetary union and with general 
principles of European Union law. The High Court dismissed the claims. 
Hearing an appeal against the decision of the High Court, the Supreme 
Court has decided to stay the proceedings and to refer three questions  
to the Court for a preliminary ruling11. As to the first question the Supreme 
Court sought to ascertain whether Decision 2011/199 is valid in so far  
as it amends Article 136 TFEU by providing for the insertion,  
on the basis of the simplified revision procedure under Article 48(6) TEU, 
of an Article 136(3) relating to the establishment of a stability mechanism.  
As to the second question the Supreme Court asked whether a Member 
State of the European Union whose currency is the euro, is entitled to enter 
into and ratify an international agreement such as the ESM Treaty.  
As to the third question the Supreme Court asked if the European Council 
Decision is held valid, is the entitlement of a Member State to enter into 
and ratify an international agreement such as the ESM Treaty subject  
to the entry into force of that Decision. 
The European Court decided to apply the accelerated procedure  
and, which is very extraordinary, to sit as a full Court (27 judges). Written 
observations were submitted in the proceedings by the applicant  
and eleven governments, the European Parliament, and the European 
Commission. The particular importance of this case for the Union is shown 
by the fact that the European Council also intervened. 
  
III.  VIEW OF THE ADVOCATE GENERAL 
 
Because the President of the Court decided that a reference  
for preliminary ruling is to be pursuant to an expedited procedure,  
the court ruled after hearing the Advocate General’s View12. 
                                                     
11  For the complete text of the preliminary questions see par. 28 of the Judgment. 
12  Article 105 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
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In her legal assessment, Advocate General Kokott stated  
as a preliminary remark that the Court of Justice may in principle review 
not only the procedure relating to a decision on a Treaty amendment 
adopted pursuant to Article 48(6) TEU, but also its content. She held  
that a restriction on the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to a review  
of the validity of a decision whose content consists of a Treaty  
amendment and its compliance with procedural requirements cannot  
be found in the Treaties. That finding is particularly significant given that 
Article 269 TFEU expressly lays down such a restriction in other 
circumstances, namely in respect of acts adopted pursuant to Article 7 TEU. 
According to the Advocate General, a decision of the European  
Council adopted pursuant to the first sentence of the second paragraph  
of Article 48(6) TEU must also be assessed by reference to provisions  
of primary law which lie outside part three of the TFEU. To that extent  
it is for the Court of Justice to review whether the object of such a decision 
is a Treaty amendment which is confined to an amendment of Part Three  
of the TFEU or constitutes an amendment of other provisions of primary 
law. 
With regard to the problem of whether the amendment of Article 136 
TFEU which is provided for in Decision 2011/199 leads to an increase  
in the competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties, the Advocate 
General held the view, that it does not increase the competences conferred 
on the Union in the Treaties and therefore does not infringe the third 
paragraph of Article 48(6) TEU. 
 
IV.  THE JUDGMENT 
 
With respect to the first question of the High Court as to whether 
Decision 2011/199 is valid on the basis of the simplified revision  
procedure under Article 48(6) TEU, the Court first examined  
its jurisdiction, then admissibility and substance. 
Most of the governments intervening in the case consider that  
the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to review the compatibility  
of Decision 2011/199 with the Treaties and with the general principles  
of European Union law. In this regard, the court stated that the European 
Council is one of the Union’s institutions listed in Article 13(1) TEU  
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and the Court has jurisdiction, under indent (b) of the first  
paragraph of Article 267 TFEU “to give preliminary rulings concerning  
(...) the validity (…) of acts of the institutions”, the Court has, in principle, 
jurisdiction to examine the validity of a decision of the European Council13. 
The duty of the Court, as the institution which, under the first 
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, is to ensure that the law is observed  
in the interpretation and application of the Treaties, to examine the validity 
of a decision of the European Council based on Article 48(6) TEU14.  
Various Member States questioned the admissibility of the first 
question referred. Ireland pointed out that the applicant ought to have 
challenged the validity of Decision 2011/199 by means of an action  
for annulment under Article 263 TFEU. The Court noticed that the 
recognition of a party’s right to plead the invalidity of an act of the Union 
presupposes that that party did not have the right to bring, under  
Article 263 TFEU, a direct action for the annulment of that act.  
For the Court, it was not evident that the applicant in the main proceedings 
had beyond doubt standing to bring an action for the annulment  
of Decision 2011/199 under Article 263 TFEU15. 
Then the Court held, that the amendment of the TFEU envisaged  
by Decision 2011/199 concerns solely the provisions of Part Three  
of the TFEU and it does not increase the competences conferred  
on the Union in the Treaties. The amendment of Article 136 TFEU which  
is effected by Decision 2011/199 does not confer any new competence  
on the Union. It creates no legal basis for the Union to be able to undertake 
any action which was not possible before the entry into force  







                                                     
13  Judgment in case C-370/12, par. 31. 
14  Ibidem, par. 35. 
15  Ibidem, par. 41-42. 
16  Ibidem, par. 73. 
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V.  REMARKS 
 
1. COULD THE COURT OF JUSTICE REVIEW THE LEGALITY OF A EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
DECISION WHICH ADOPTS AMENDMENTS OF THE TFEU ACCORDING TO THE SIMPLIFIED 
PROCEDURES FOR TREATY AMENDMENT INTRODUCED BY THE LISBON TREATY? 
 
The principal legal question raised in the cases before the Court 
concerns the notion of the power of review of the European Council 
decisions granted to the Court under indent (b) of the first paragraph  
of Article 267 TFEU. The Lisbon Treaty integrates the European Council 
within the EU institutional structures and increases its decision-making 
powers. One of those new decision-making powers is the power to adopt  
a decision amending all or part of the provisions of part three of the Treaty 
on the functioning of the European Union.  
As Advocate General Kokott has correctly submitted, it follows from 
indents (a) and (b) of the first paragraph of Article 267 TFEU that the Court 
of Justice does not have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings  
on the validity of the Treaties, but only on the validity of acts  
of the institutions of the European Union. The Treaty provides some 
limitation on the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, and such restrictions 
are provided in Article 269 TFEU in other circumstances, namely in respect 
of acts adopted pursuant to Article 7 TEU17. The Treaty does not provide 
any exceptions to the European Council decisions taken under  
the simplified revision procedure. 
Decision 2011/199 can however not be placed in the category  
of “Treaties” for the purposes of indent (a) of the first paragraph  
of Article 267 TFEU, but rather constitutes, under the first sentence  
of the second paragraph of Article 48(6) TEU, merely an act intended  
to effect a Treaty amendment18. Hence, with a view to the rule of law  
and protection of the institutional balance, the European Council decision 
adopted pursuant to Article 48(6) TEU should be subject to judicial 
review19. 
                                                     
17  See: Opinion in case C-370/12, par. 23. 
18  Ibidem, par. 20-21. 
19  See: de Witte, Beukers, supra note 9, p. 827. 
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Special mention should be made in this connection of the criteria 
according to which Treaty amendments under the simplified revision 
procedure can be reviewed. The check which the Court is authorised  
to carry out in respect of the Article 48(6) TEU includes both verifying  
the procedure relating to a decision on a Treaty amendment adopted 
pursuant to Article 48(6) TEU and its content. 
The procedural requirements of Article 48(6) include: first, that  
a proposal for revision must be submitted to the European Council  
by the government of a Member State, the European Commission,  
or the European Parliament and, when the amendments concern changes  
in the monetary area, with the European Central Bank. Secondly,  
that the decision of the European Council must be adopted unanimously 
after consultation with the European Parliament and the European 
Commission. Furthermore that the decision does not enter into force prior 
to approval by the Member States in accordance with their constitutional 
requirements. 
The second subparagraph of Article 48(6) TEU noted two substantive 
requirements for implementation of the decision. Such decision  
“shall not increase the competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties”  
and the European Council may adopt only a decision amending all or part 
of the provisions of Part Three of the TEU Treaty. 
 
2. WHETHER THE REVISION OF THE ARTICLE 136(3) OF THE TREATY INCREASES  
THE COMPETENCE S CONFERRED ON THE UNION IN THE TREATIES? 
 
Fundamental doubts arise specifically over the appropriateness  
of Article 48(6) TEU as the legal basis for the revision of the Article 136(3) 
TFEU. As noted above, the implementation of the decision in simplified 
treaty revision procedure is limited – the amendment shall not increase  
the competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties. It should  
be considered whether or not use of that procedure in Decision 2011/199 
was justified. 
Under the Article 3(1)(c) TFEU the Union has exclusive competence  
in the area of monetary policy for the Member States whose currency  
is the euro. It must therefore be determined, whether the Decision 2011/199 
encroaches on the Union’s exclusive competence in the area of monetary 
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policy and grants to Member States a competence in the area of monetary 
policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro.  
In the light of recital 6 of the preamble to the Decision 2011/199,  
the amendment does not confer any new competence on the Union.  
As regards the grounds of the judgment in Pringle concerning the problem 
whether the revision of the TFEU increases the competences conferred  
on the Union in the Treaties, it must be stated that, in paragraph 73  
of that judgment, the Tribunal in fact held that: “That amendment  
does not confer any new competence on the Union. The amendment  
of Article 136 TFEU which is effected by Decision 2011/199 creates no legal 
basis for the Union to be able to undertake any action which  
was not possible before the entry into force of the amendment  
of the FEU Treaty”. In her written observations, the Advocate General 
appeared to adopt the same position20. 
Indeed, literally the Decision 2011/199, in so far as it amends  
Article 136 TFEU by adding a paragraph 3 which provides that  
“the Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability 
mechanism”, transfers new competences to those Member States whose 
currency is the euro. Of the 28 EU Member States today, 17 have adopted 
the euro. Two – United Kingdom and Denmark – have an opt-out from 
Euro membership. Most other states who currently have a “derogation”, 
because they have not yet met the conditions for the adoption of the euro, 
are prospectively joining the Euro membership and need to move towards 
economic convergence.  
However, if the stability mechanism “will provide the necessary tool 
for dealing with such cases of risk to the financial stability of the euro  
area and is designed to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area  
as a whole”21, it can be assumed that ESM leads to a substantial 
interference with the financial policies not only Member States in the euro 
area, but also Member States that are obliged to join the Euro membership. 
                                                     
20  See: Opinion in case C-370/12, par. 47. 
21  See: recital 4 of the preamble to the Decision 2011/199. 
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Those EU members will not have, as importantly, the impact  
on development of the ESM22.  
The claimant argued that the stability mechanism realized  
the EU monetary policy because its primary purpose was to ensure  
price stability and save the euro. The Member States therefore  
had no competence to adopt legally binding acts in the form  
of an international treaty because the Union has exclusive competence  
in that area. The Member States, for a change, maintained that the stability 
mechanism was concerned with economic policy, which is not within  
the EU’s exclusive competence. The CJEU ruled that: “the objective 
pursued by that mechanism is to safeguard the stability of the euro area  
as a whole, which is clearly distinct from the objective of maintaining price 
stability, which is the primary objective of the Union’s monetary policy. 
Even though the stability of the Euro area may have repercussions  
on the stability of the currency used within that area, an economic policy 
measure cannot be treated as equivalent to a monetary policy  
measure for the sole reason that it may have indirect effects on the stability 
of the euro”23. 
Nevertheless, it is not clear exactly what “safeguard the stability  
of the euro area as a whole” means. In economic terms, the stability  
of the euro area as a whole is surely a condition precedent to price  
stability within that area24, including monetary policy which  
is the exclusive competence of the Union.  
We should ask also about the relationship between the Stability 
Mechanism law (ESW treaty) and EU law, which is unclear25. The Member 
States whose currency is the euro, as was noted by the Court, are entitled  
to conclude an agreement between themselves for the establishment  
                                                     
22  See: C. Mik, Opinia w sprawie decyzji Rady Europejskiej z dnia 16-17 grudnia 2010 r. dotyczącej 
zmiany art. 136 Traktatu o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej, w szczególności procedury  
jej stanowienia w UE oraz procedury jej ratyfikacji [Opinion on the Decision of the European Council 
of 16-17 December 2010 Amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, Particularly in Relation to the Procedure of Establishing It Within the EU and the Procedure 
for Its Ratification] Przegląd Sejmowy [The Sejm Review] 2012, no. 2 (109), pp. 158-159.  
23  See: Judgement in case C-370/12, par. 56. 
24  See: P. Craig, Pringle: Legal Reasoning, Text, Purpose and Teleology, Maastricht Journal  
of European and Comparative Law 2013, vol. 20, p. 5. 
25  P. Craig, Pringle and Use of EU Institutions Outside the EU Legal Framework: Foundations, 
Procedure and Substance, The European Constitutional Law Review 2013, vol. 9, p. 263. 
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of a stability mechanism of the kind envisaged by Article 1 of Decision 
2011/199. It goes without saying that, although Member States are required 
to comply with Union law when establishing a mechanism such  
as the ESM26, individuals might not be able to invoke Union law against 
measures designed by EU institutions and adopted by the Member States 
in their capacity as ESM Members. The establishment of the ESM outside 
the EU legal order might be seen as placing the ESM beyond the duties 
imposed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights27.  
For the foregoing reasons, it would appear that the Article 136 TFEU 
Treaty change should be viewed as in some way increasing  
the competences or scope of the Union in such a way as to go beyond  
the existing scope or objectives of the Treaties. Therefore, it must  
be considered that a provision such as Article 48(6) TUE appears  
to be manifestly inappropriate for adopting Decision 2011/199. Hence,  
in this instance, the ordinary revision procedure would be preferable.  
 
                                                     
26  When giving effect to commitments assumed under international agreements,  
be it an agreement between Member States, they are required, subject to the provisions  
of Article 351 TFEU, to comply with the obligations that European law imposes on them.  
See in this connection, case C-307/97 Saint-Gobain ZN [1999] ECR I-6161, par. 57 to 59  
and case C–55/00 Gottardo [2002] ECR I–413, par. 33. 
27  See: P.A. Van Malleghem, Pringle: A Paradigm Shift in the European Union’s Monetary 
Constitution, German Law Journal 2013, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 155, 158. 
 
 
